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ABSTRACT
This study analyses efficiency levels in Spanish local governments and their determining
factors through the application of DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) methodology. It aims to
find out to what extent inefficiency arises from external factors beyond the control of the
entity, or on the other hand, how much it is due to inadequate management of productive
resources. The results show that on the whole, there is still a wide margin within which
managers could increase local government efficiency levels, although it is revealed that a
great deal of inefficiency is due to exogenous factors. It is specifically found that the size of
the entity, per capita tax revenue, the per capita grants or the amount of commercial activity
are some of the factors determining local government inefficiency.
Keywords: Local government performance; Data Envelopment Analysis, Efficiency and
Quality.
JEL Classification: D60, H71, H72
51. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, governments have become increasingly concerned about the need to
manage their resources more efficiently, with the aim of reducing public expenditure without
affecting the standard of the services they provide. In this article, we focus our analysis on
local government management. Local governments play an important role in the provision of
public services, and form a subsection that, over time, has taken on more responsibilities.
This in turn has led to an accumulation of operations, and a consequent increase in
expenditure and greater weight in the country’s economy. In the Spanish experience,
following the approval of the 1978 Constitution, important changes have been experienced
which have led to an increase in the responsibilities of state and local governments in the
provision of public services. Table 1 in section 2.2 shows how local administration accounts
for more than 6% of GNP and, excluding Social Security, absorbs 20% of public resources.
The principal objective of this study is to analyse the levels of both efficiency and quality in
these entities, and determine what financial, socio-economic and budgetary characteristics
are shared by local governments with similar efficiency level values. In this way, we will be
able to find out whether inefficiencies can be explained by external factors, and as such are
beyond the control of the authorities, or whether they are due solely to bad management. It
could also be the case that inefficiency is due to a combination of both aspects. As set out
below (in section 2.3), the variables related to quality are categorical. As they are non-
continuous variables, and different from those representing inputs and outputs, a suitable
procedure to deal with this type of variable had to be established. From the various available
alternatives, we have followed the proposal set out by Banker and Morey (1987), as we
consider it to be the most suited to the characteristics of our sample.
The article is divided into four sections. Section 2 sets out the methodology used in the
efficiency analysis, the sample of local authorities analysed, and the variables, the inputs
used and the outputs obtained, which are defined. The third section analyses the results of
the empirical analysis, while the final section presents the essential conclusions drawn from
the study.
62. METHODOLOGY
2.1. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE DEA
The choice of the DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) model for the analysis of local
government efficiency is due to its conceptual simplicity and its versatility as a work tool, both
of which enable the elimination of many of the difficulties inherent in the study of public
services. Amongst these difficulties, its multi-product nature and the fact that market prices
do not exist are worthy of note.
The DEA model is posed as a problem of linear programming that enables an efficiency
analysis to be carried out, subject to a series of restrictions. Within the public sector, more
often than not, outputs are either totally or partially set externally, and for this reason, it
makes more sense to evaluate efficiency in terms of the minimisation of inputs. Therefore,
the mathematical formulation of the DEA, in the version aimed at the control and reduction of
inputs, can be expressed as follows:
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Where è represents the factor that weights the inputs of the evaluated unit, and its value
measures the efficiency of unit ‘i’ subject to evaluation (Decision Making Unit, or DMU, is the
term used in the literature on this subject). X and Y are defined as the input and output
matrices which contain all the units (DMUs) to be evaluated, while xi and yi represent the
DMU inputs and outputs subject to evaluation. Finally, ë is a weight vector which describes
the importance of the DMUs considered to determine the virtual producer or reference unit
which is used as a comparison in order to evaluate unit ‘i’.
Programme [1] must be resolved the same number of times as there are units to be
evaluated (once for each DMU). The DEA methodology defines a linear programme that
compares each producer with the “best” producers which make up the “best practice
frontier”. The key to the analysis consists of finding the best virtual DMU for each real DMU.
The model sets out with two restrictions: the first ( yY i³l ), forces the virtual DMU to
7produce at least as many outputs as those obtained by the DMU under analysis. The second
restriction ( 0³- lq Xxi ) enables us to determine the lowest possible input consumption.
By resolving the linear programming corresponding to each one of the units under study, we
obtain a coefficient q for each DMU. If qi is the same as the unit, the unit is defined as
efficient,1 while in the remaining cases, i.e. when qi < 1, it indicates inefficient performance in
relation to the units located at the frontier.
The underlying technology in programme [1] shows constant returns to scale. In other words,
there is no restriction that would impede the comparison of low (high) dimension units with
other units of a superior (inferior) size. In this way, the vector ë elements will show whether
the best practice frontier is made up of smaller units (if ë>1) or larger sized units (if ë<1) than
the evaluated DMU. More suitable technological assumptions can be introduced when the
reference technology is defined. Thus, if we want the comparison to consider only units of a
similar size to that of the evaluated DMU, we can introduce the assumption of the variable
returns to scale. That only requires adding one further restriction to programme [1]:
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2.2   SAMPLE SELECTION
The relative size of the local public sector is set in table 1. It shows how local
administration accounts for more than 6% of GNP and, excluding Social Security, absorbs
20% of public resources.
         Table 1. Spanish public sector composition (as percentage of GNP)
Current
resources
1995
Capital
resources
1995
Current
resources
1999
Capital
resources
1999
Central Administration 19.51 0.58 19.47 0.40
Regional Administration 5.40 0.86 6.65 1.11
Local Administration 5.47 0.48 5.68 0.58
Social Security 18.02 0.17 17.60 0.18
         Source: BADESPE DATABASE (Public Administration Accounts)
        Web page address: http://www.estadief.minhac.es/badespe/bancodedatos/capublicas.htm
8In order to carry out the study, statistical information from the Valencian Audit Institution and
the Ministry for Public Administration was used (the authorities analysed are taken from the
Valencian Autonomous Community, an area of considerable industrial and service activity on
the Mediterranean coast in the east of Spain). The outputs were obtained from information
gathered in a survey of local infrastructure and equipment devised by the Ministry for Public
Administration, while inputs came from the budget data of local authorities in the Valencian
Community which presented information to the Valencian Audit Institution in the years under
study (1992-95). The sample was thus made up of 258 municipalities.
It is important to highlight the fact that when the data was selected, it was decided to use
implemented expenditures and revenues (net charges recorded and net liabilities recorded)
instead of forecasts, although in some cases, this was at the expense of being up-to-date
due to publication delays. However, the use of budgeted data would have greatly distorted
the conclusions, since it is well known that budgeted figures generally underestimate
expenditure and overestimate revenues.
2.3  DEFINITION OF INPUT AND OUTPUT VARIABLES
In output specifications we differentiate on the one hand, production variables and on the
other, quality variables. The information available on the variable of the quality of services
provided is of a categorical nature (the quality of the services offered is arranged in three
classifications: good, normal or bad). It is quantified using the proposal set out by Banker and
Morey (1986), which involves breaking down the quality variable into two categorical
variables: d1 and d2. Thus, for one unit j, the values taken by d1 and d2 will be the following:
dj1 = dj2 = 0, if the quality is bad.
dj1 =1  and  dj2 = 0, if the quality is normal.
dj1 = dj2 = 1, if the quality is good.
In terms of output production, the specification of variables has be representative of the
essential services provided by local corporations. In the first place, with the aim of setting
bounds on what essential services are, we refer to Municipal Law where we have found the
minimal services required (table 2 contains these services depending on Council size and
the related variable according to the availability of the data bases we have utilized).
                                                                                                                                                                            
1 The literature describes this situation as one of weak efficiency. A more robust definition, based on Pareto’s optimality
concept, requires additional conditions. An excellent presentation of the various notions of efficiency can be found in Cooper,
9Given the difficulty of quantifying public sector output, it is often essential to look for proxy
variables. For this reason, and based on the work of De Borger and Kerstens (1996a, b),
Taïrou (2000) and Vanden Eeckaut (1993), the number of inhabitants is chosen to reflect the
basic administrative services provided to the local population.
Table 2 Output indicators based on the minimum services provided
Population
bands Minimum services provided Output indicators
- Public street lighting. - Number of lighting points
- Cemetery - Total population
- Waste collection - Waste collected
- Street cleaning - Street infrastructure surface area
- Supply of drinking water to
households
- Population, street infrastructure surface
area
- Access to population centres - Street infrastructure surface area
- Surfacing of public roads - Street infrastructure surface area
In all local
authorities
- Regulation of food and drink - Total population
- Public parks - Surface area of public parks
- Public library - Total population
- Market - Total population
In local
authorities with
populations of
over 5.000, in
addition - Treatment of collected waste - Waste collected
- Civil protection - Total population
- Provision of social services - Total population
- Fire prevention and extinction - Street infrastructure surface area
- Public sports facilities - Total population
In local
authorities with
populations of
over 20.000, in
addition - Abattoir - Total population
- Urban passenger transport
service
- Total population and total surface areaIn local
authorities with
populations of
over 50.000, in
addition
- Protection of the environment - Total surface area
The descriptive values of the outputs used are given below (Table 3).
Table 3. Descriptive values of the variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Population 5556.344 8641.432 23 55457
Number of votes 1349.552 1760.333 11 8824
Number of lighting points 660.2578 1198.776 13 12600
Tons of waste 11253.57 61166.16 14.66 654500
Street infrastructure surface area 140432 205777.2 2230 1308007
Registered surface area of public parks 17937.11 32141.9 70 248147
Quality (dichotomous: d1) 0.9534 0.210 0 1
Quality (d2) 0.7325 0.4434 0 1
                                                                                                                                                                            
Seiford and Tone (2000).
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However, before considering these variables as local authority outputs, we will analyse to
what extent they are explanatory of the input levels incurred by the entity. The function to be
estimated is a cost function f (·) as follows.
),,,,,,( PIVRLVCHfTC =        [3]
where,
TC: Total cost
H: Number of inhabitants
C: Weighted quality
V: Number of votes
L: Lighting points
R: Waste collected
IV: Street infrastructure surface area
P: Registered surface area of public parks
Empirical, we estimate (3) as a Cobb-Douglas functional form. Before going on to estimate
the regression models, we analyse the degree of linear association between each pair of
variables using Pearson’s linear correlation coefficient, in order to detect any possible
multicolinearity. As is widely known, the overall significance of the results may not be correct
if the independent variables are found to be very correlated (Table 4).
Table 4. Correlation matrix amongst the variables
H C V L R I. V P
H 1 0.170 0.930 0.591 0.181 0.746 0.583
C 1 0.161 0.039 0.054 0.136 -0.013
V 1 0.538 0.195 0.700 0.536
L 1 0.090 0.651 0.410
R 1 0.180 0.069
IV 1 0.570
P 1
H: Number of inhabitants; C: Quality; V: Number of votes; L: Lighting points;
R: Tons of waste collected; IV: Street infrastructure surface area; P:
Registered surface area of public parks
The most outstanding aspect observed is that the variable "number of inhabitants" is the one
which, in general terms, presents a greater correlation to the rest. Therefore, in order to
avoid problems of multicolinearity, we have estimated on the one hand, a model with the
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variable "number of inhabitants", while the rest of the variables are included in another
model. The results of the multiple linear regression analysis are shown in Table 5.
                              Table 5. Results of the regression
Model Independent Variables* b(t student)
1 Number of inhabitants 0.956
(52.534)*
Quality 0.033
(1.523)**
Votes 0.330
(8.296)*
Number of lighting points 0.338
(7.187)*
Tons of waste 0.153
(4.442)*
Street infrastructure surface area 0.147
(2.917)*
2
Registered surface area of public
parks
0.066
(2.584)*
Model 1: R2 adjusted =0.921
Model 2: R2 adjusted =0.914
(*) Significant at 1%
(**) Significant at 5%
* The dependent variable in both regressions is total cost.
The explanatory power of the regression models as a whole is good, since adjusted R2
presents very high values. However, when the adjusted R2  for model 2 ( R2 adjusted=0.914)
is compared with model 1 ( R2 adjusted=0.921) we can conclude that the "number of
inhabitants" variable is very good at explaining the variation in the dependent variable.
Before defining the inputs used, it should be pointed out that we chose to carry out two types
of evaluation: short-term and long-term frontiers. The short-term frontier is referred to when a
frontier for each year of the years analysed (1992-1995) is estimated. On the other hand,
when the long-term frontier is determined, the budget outcomes from the expenditure of1992
to 1995 are summed, and the aggregated service provision process of this period is
evaluated. We evaluate the efficiency within a long-term budgetary framework, using terms
set down by OECD (1997).
There are two reasons for estimating both types of frontier. Firstly, it enables us to verify the
existence of the so-called “political-budgetary cycles” (Rogo, 1990) if significant differences
are observed between the levels of annual efficiency and the accumulated value for the
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legislative period analysed. In second place, because in one of the specifications, the
number of votes obtained by the governing party in the previous legislature is introduced as a
quality “proxy” and it logically follows that this satisfaction derives from a whole legislative
period, and not from one particular year.
Thus, in order to determine local authority behaviour in the local government , three different
combinations of DEA models have been applied which depend on the corresponding output
specification. These models are the following:
- In DEA model 1, the output specifications taken are production variables.
- DEA model 2 includes the variable "quality of services" (the objective quality of local
authority goods and services) and the variable "level of citizen satisfaction" (subjective
appreciation of quality by the population), defined as the number of votes obtained in the
current municipal elections by the party in power in the previous elections.
- Finally, in DEA model 3, all variables are included (both production and quality variables).
This model is the most thorough one, which enables us to evaluate both efficiency and
quality at the same time.
- 
INPUT VARIABLES FOR ALL DEA MODELS:
I1. Wages and salaries (chapter 1).
I2. Expenditure on goods and services (chapter 2).
I3. Current and capital transfers (chapters 4 and 7)
I4. capital expenditure (chapter 6)
OUTPUT VARIABLES FOR ALL DEA MODELS:
DEA 1
- Total population
- Number of lighting points
- Tons of waste collected
- Street infrastructure surface area
- Public parks surface area
DEA 2
- Total population
- Number of votes obtained in elections by the party in power during the previous legislative
period.
- Quality of services (dichotomous: d1 and d2)
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DEA 3
- Total population
- Number of lighting points
- Tons of waste collected
- Street infrastructure surface area
- Public parks surface area
- Number of votes obtained in elections by the party in power during the previous legislative
period.
- Quality of services (dichotomous: d1 and d2)
3. RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE APPLICATION OF THE EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY
FRONTIER TO THE SAMPLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES ANALYSED
3.1. BREAKDOWN OF GLOBAL TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY INTO PURE TECHNICAL
EFFICIENCY AND SCALE EFFICIENCY
To carry out this breakdown, programme [1] was first applied to all the local authorities in
the sample. The coefficient obtained (in a technological assumption of constant returns to
scale) enabled us to determine the so-called global technical efficiency coefficient (GTE).
Programme [1] was applied once more, this time introducing the weights restrictions
mentioned in section 2.1, and the pure technical efficiency coefficient (PTE) was obtained in
a technological environment of variable returns to scale. Finally, the efficiency (or
inefficiency) of scale (ES, which is included in the GTE part due to the assumption of
constant returns to scale) was determined by relating GTE and PTE (ES = GTE/PTE).
Table 6 presents a synthesis of the obtained results. The inefficiency due to scale, i.e., that
caused by a below optimum size of the entity, is around 8%-24% depending on the different
output specifications. In this way, the entities have to accept a level of efficiency of 77%-92%
which is impossible to correct if the dimensions of the entity are not modified. Global
technical efficiency was between 66% and 75% and pure technical efficiency between 75%
and 89% In other words, excessive use of resources occurred (inefficiency in the use of
inputs), which oscillated between 11% and 25%
In order to verify whether significant differences in efficiency levels occurred between the
initial period and the final period, we applied Wilcoxon’s non-parametric test. The results
indicate that the differences in averages between groups are significant at a reliability level of
90%.
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Table 6. Global Technical Efficiency
DEA
models Years Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
% efficient
DMUs
% inefficient
DMUs
1992 66.66 20.74 5.18 100 14.67% 85.33%
1993 71.33 19.37 15.93 100 15.83% 84.17%
1994 72.73 19.16 10.79 100 11.97% 88.03%
1995 73.06 19.59 9.09 100 17.37% 82.63%
DEA 1
1992-95 75.42 18.03 23.96 100 17.05% 82.95%
1992 62.25 20.69 5.18 100 9.30% 90.69%
1993 66.11 20.04 15.19 100 9.69% 90.31%
1994 69.14 20.49 11.07 100 9.69% 90.31%
1995 67.64 20.74 8.71 100 11.24% 88.76%
DEA 2
1992-95 69.71 19.61 16.84 100 11.67% 88.33%
1992 67.11 21.03 5.18 100 15.89% 84.11%
1993 71.52 19.41 15.93 100 16.27% 83.72%
1994 73.30 19.31 10.79 100 13.17% 86.82%
1995 73.29 19.67 9.09 100 18.22% 81.78%
DEA 3
1992-95 75.57 18.06 24.04 100 18.22% 81.78%
Pure Technical efficiency
DEA
models Years Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
% efficient
DMUs
% inefficient
DMUs
1992 84.18 19.21 10.89 100 41.31% 58.69%
1993 86.01 17.34 23.10 100 41.70% 58.30%
1994 85.18 18.12 20.50 100 41.70% 58.30%
1995 86.03 18.15 23.68 100 45.56% 54.44%
DEA 1
1992-95 85.21 17.32 24.18 100 37.21% 62.79%
1992 75.04 21.38 11.16 100 22.86% 77.13%
1993 76.80 21.18 20.36 100 24.81% 75.19%
1994 77.41 21.28 18.56 100 25.96% 74.03%
1995 79.83 22.29 14.86 100 30.62% 69.38%
DEA 2
1992-95 76.31 20.83 18.52 100 23.64% 76.35%
1992 88.56 17.14 10.89 100 55.04% 44.96%
1993 88.65 15.92 25.50 100 49.81% 50.19%
1994 89.67 16.03 36.24 100 56.98% 43.02%
1995 89.92 16.08 28.75 100 57.36% 42.64%
DEA 3
1992-95 89.08 15.87 28.77 100 54.65% 45.34%
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Efficiency on Scale
DEA
models Years Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
% efficient
DMUs
% inefficient
DMUs
1992 79.40 16.82 26.00 100 14.73% 85.27%
1993 83.13 14.22 27.51 100 15.89% 84.11%
1994 85.71 13.92 27.51 100 12.02% 87.98%
1995 85.30 14.71 25.64 100 18.22% 81.78%
DEA 1
1992-95 88.77 11.75 50.41 100 17.83% 82.17%
1992 83.26 14.30 25.28 100 12.02% 97.98%
1993 86.60 12.29 48.95 100 13.95% 86.05%
1994 89.66 12.16 37.15 100 15.50% 84.50%
1995 88.62 13.19 30.60 100 22.86% 77.14%
DEA 2
1992-95 92.01 10.94 39.19 100 29.07% 70.93%
1992 76.88 17.92 23.72 100 15.89% 84.11%
1993 80.64 15.16 27.37 100 16.28% 83.72%
1994 81.67 15.42 27.51 100 12.79% 87.21%
1995 81.47 15.83 23.28 100 18.21% 81.79%
DEA 3
1992-95 85.02 14.06 33.22 100 18.22% 81.78%
3.2.  EFFICIENCY ACCORDING TO LOCAL AUTHORITY SIZE
Pure technical inefficiency levels are very different if we classify local authorities
according to their number of inhabitants. Pure technical inefficiency, i.e., inefficiency caused
by excessive consumption of resources, is greater in entities with a lower number of
inhabitants. Of the entities with a population of over 5,000, 21.33% are efficient in all output
specifications, whereas only 15.93% of the populations of under 5,000 inhabitants are
efficient. It can be observed in Graph 1 how the average of the efficiency levels is higher in
entities with larger number of inhabitants. However, this inefficiency does not take problems
of scale into account, and only compares entities with those of similar sizes.
Global technical efficiency covers all entities, irrespective of their size, and the study
indicated that local authorities with populations of 5,000 and 20,000 showed a higher GTE in
practically all of the output specifications. This result could indicate this population band as
being the optimum size for an entity to be considered efficient (Graph 2).
Inefficiency of scale increases as the number of inhabitants grows, which suggests that the
level of inefficiency is impossible to correct without modifying the dimensions of the entity. In
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a public entity, there is little sense in looking for solutions to these inefficiencies, since, unlike
private companies, it is practically impossible to change the size of a town (Graph 3).
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GRAPH 3
These results can be interpreted as follows. The optimum size corresponds to relatively small
municipalities, since inefficiency of scale is lower in the under 5,000 population band.
However, larger municipalities are nearer to the frontier. In other words, although they are
not the optimum size, they have better and greater resources (qualified staff, better
information technology resources etc.), which places them very close to their frontier in
variable performance (Graph 4).
                                                                                          GRAPH 4
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3.3. BUDGETARY STRUCTURE AND EFFICIENCY. ANALISIS OF THE OBSERVED
RELATION
We now attempt to analyse whether the entities display similar budgetary structures.
Through this analysis, we are able to find out whether local authority managers should base
the formulation and implementation of budgets on a particular model, or if on the contrary,
the composition of the budget has insignificant bearing on whether the local authority is
classified as efficient.
To carry this out, we used Finger and Kreinin’s similarity index (1979). This index has been
used in the field of international commerce, and when applied to the case in point, is
represented by the following expression:
[ ]{ }S ab M in x a x bi i
i
( ) ( ), ( ) *= å 100
In our study, S(ab) measures the similarity between two entities "a" and "b" with regard to the
budgetary structure of expenditures and revenues. Xi (a) and Xi (b) represent the
percentages of item “i” in entities a and b respectively.
S(ab) oscillates between 0 and 100, i.e., the closer S (ab) is to 100, the greater the similarity
between the two entities will be. Hence, the two extreme cases would be the following:
· S(ab)=100 when Xi(a)=Xi(b) for each item “i”, i.e., when the composition of the two
entities is identical
· S(ab)=0 when the composition of Xi(a) is totally different from that of Xi(b).
This index, however, is limited in that it only allows for the comparison of similarity between
two entities. Since our study sets out to calculate similarity between various entities, we
attempt to get round this limitation by calculating a similarity index for each local authority
with respect to the rest.
By using the similarity indexes applied to the budget (expenditures and revenues), we
analyse the behaviour that these indices on average presented from 1992 to 1995, together
with dispersion.
In order to find out whether the level of similarity is higher in entities classified as efficient, in
all the defined output specifications two groups were differentiated: on the one hand, efficient
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entities (with a result of 990 similarity indices) and on the other, all the entities (with 3,3.150
indices) –Table 7-.
Table 7. Descriptive values of similarity indices
Mean Std. Dev.
Entities
Nº of similarity
indices Expenditures Revenues Expenditures Revenues
Total 33,150 68.77 73.47 15.58 13.54
Efficient 990 67.54 65.74 17.68 16.74
In order to be able to interpret the results, we tested the null hypothesis of equal averages
between the groups, against the alternative hypothesis of difference of averages. A non-
parametric sign test was used to carry this out, the results of which indicate that at a
significance level of 0.05, the null hypothesis of equal  averages was not rejected. We can
therefore conclude that significant differences do not exist between the budgetary structures
of efficient local authorities and the rest of the local authorities. In other words, there is no
specific budgetary structure which we could classify as efficient, and thus an explanation for
these inefficiencies must be sought in other factors.
3.4. DETERMINING FACTORS OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY LEVELS
In order to analyse whether the explanation for the differences in efficiency levels
between distinct entities was to be found in a series of socio-economic and financial
variables, we applied the Tobit model. This technique has been employed by authors such
as De Borger et al. (1994), Martin and Page (1983) and Rhodes and Southwick (1989),
amongst others, and is used in cases in which the dependent variable is censored. In this
study, the censored variable is that of the efficiency levels, which cannot be higher than the
unit. For our purposes, standard Tobit model can be defined in the following way:
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Where iu are assumed to be i.i.d. drawings from N(0, 
2s ). The latent variable *iy is not
directly observable. Its observed counterpart is the efficiency index iy . For 
*
iy less than 1
both iy and ix  are observed while for 1
* ³iy  the ix are observed and the iy equal the limit
value of 1. It is well-know that the Tobit estimates to any violation in the in the underlying
assumptions.
In our case, *iy  represents efficiency levels (censored variable) and 
'
ix  are the socio-
economic and financial variables. Specifically, the variables appearing in Table 8 are those
taken as independent variables.
Table 8. Socio-economic and financial variables
ABREV. VARIABLE FV/SV
TAX REVENUE Tax revenue / Number inhabitants FV
GRANTS Grants / Number inhabitants FV
FINAN.LIAB Financial liabilities (chapter 9 revenues) / Number inhabitants FV
UNEMPLOYMENT % Unemployment / Legal population SV
TOURISM Tourism index SV
COMMERCIAL Level of commercial activity SV
ECON. LEVEL. Economic level SV
FV: Financial variables
SV: Socio-economic variables
The results obtained from the Tobit analysis appear in Table 9.
 Table 9. Determining factors of efficiency levels: Tobit Results
DEA 1
(4 Inputs/ 5 Outputs)
DEA 2
(4 Inputs/ 3 Outputs)
DEA 3
(4 Inputs/ 6 Outputs)
TAX REVENUE -0.679
(-0.885)*
-0.110
(-5.557)*
-0.056
(-2.048)**
GRANTS -0.115
  (-3.360)*
-0.131
  (-4.468)*
-0.164
  (-4.127)*
FINAN. LIAB 0.147
(1.824)
-0.111
  (-1.715)
0.118
(1.243)
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.746
(-0.539)
-0.396
(-0.332)
-0.382
(-0.231)
TOURISM -0.077
(-1.275)
-0.098
(-1.875)
-0.743
(-1.006)
COMMERCIAL 0.094
  (2.110)**
0.159
  (4.021)*
0.124
  (2.121)**
ECON LEVEL. -2.430
(-1.295)
-1.467
(-0.920)
-1.530
(-0.686)
CONSTANT 120.29
  (11.673)*
120.38
  (13.757)*
126.04
  (10.188)*
 The figures brackets are t statistics.
(*) Significant at 1%
(**) Significant at 5%
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The results indicate that the socio-economic variables, such as unemployment, level of
tourism, economic level2, do not significantly affect the level of efficiency in public
administrations. Of all the socio-economic and financial variables included in this study, only
the per capita tax revenue, the per capita grants and the level of commercial activity appear
to have any bearing on efficiency levels (Table 10).
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyses the determining factors of local government efficiency levels, in an
attempt to distinguish the factors which can be influenced by management decisions from
those which are exogenous. In this vein, the results obtained indicate that there is a wide
margin available to public managers for optimisation in the use of public resources, but that
some of these inefficiencies are due to exogenous factors, such as entity size, per capita tax
revenue, per capita grants and level of commercial activity.
With regard to entity size, the optimum size is that of relatively small municipalities. However,
those with the largest populations, despite not being the optimum size, have better and
greater resources at their disposal, placing them very near their frontier in variable returns to
scale.
The per capita tax revenue and the level of per capita grants also affect efficiency levels. The
results obtained indicate that entities with higher tax revenues and/or those receiving higher
grants are the most inefficient in the management of their resources. The same results were
obtained in studies carried out by De Borger et al. (1994, pp. 354) and De Borger and
Kerstens (1996a, pp. 168) into Belgian local authorities. It therefore seems reasonable to
expect that a local authority with a high capacity for obtaining resources (through tax revenue
and/or grants) would be less motivated to manage them adequately. In contrast, the level of
commercial activity has a positive impact on efficiency levels. This can also be observed in
the work of Giménez and Prior (2000) on Catalonian local authorities. The authors consider
that local authorities with a higher level of commercial activity subject their local authority
managers to greater pressure to administer the services provided in the most efficient way.
                                                       
2 The Spanish Annual Commercial Report (Anuario Comercial de España) takes the municipal per capita disposable household
income as the economic level indicator.
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